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This article examines two contrasting approaches to the governance of police investigations 
for ensuring that cybercrime-policing is lawful and ethical. The Netherlands has a national 
police force working under the direction of an equally centralised prosecution service 
according to specific laws on the use of special powers of surveillance, with evidence tested 
judicially when added incrementally to the case file. Theoretically, the process of adapting to 
the novel features of cybercrime policing should be much easier than within the much more 
fragmented policing structure in England and Wales, where unreliable evidence is 
challengeable only at the trial stage and the laws governing police action are equally 
fragmented. The Dutch police, however, have not found it easy to adapt concepts of covert 
policing developed in the 1990’s to their on-line investigative activities, despite the existence 
of comparatively detailed guidance and case law for undercover policing in the “real” world.  
In the UK, the police seem unsure which requirements and concepts actually apply to their 
different on-line-investigations. More generally, it is concluded that legal comparisons of the 
kind undertaken in this article can identify general bottlenecks and barriers to adapting to the 
cyber environment, but such analysis cannot identify best practices that are readily 
transferable from one country to another. Legal transplants are a potentially hazardous 
undertaking because any practices and policies that work successfully will do so because they 
are necessarily compliant with the underlying systemic legal-cultural factors that make each 
legal system unique. Indeed, we make no attempt to identify best practices, other than to 
remark that the centralised nature of Dutch policing seems to afford some advantage, 
although, for historical and legal-cultural reasons, centralisation is unlikely to be an option 









1 With thanks to Wouter Stol for his help on finding information about the Netherlands that we would otherwise 
have been unable to trace. 
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In this contribution that is concerned with the response of the criminal justice system to 
cybercrime, we examine with how different countries (England and Wales and the 
Netherlands) deal with policing crime on the internet.2  We do not intend to engage in the 
debate around the definition(s) of different forms of crime that may be committed with the 
use of digital devices.3 Rather, we want to focus on the particular problem of regulating 
cyber-policing on both the clear and dark web, although we do wish to explain at the outset 
what we understand by cybercrime.  
The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) in England and Wales recognises two 
“overarching” areas of cyber-crime: 
 
- cyber-dependent crimes, which can only be committed through the use of online devices 
and where the devices are both the tool to commit the crime and the target of the crime – e.g. 
Distributed denial of service (Ddos) attacks; and  
- cyber-enabled crimes, traditional crimes which can be increased in scale by using 
computers.4 
 
The approach of the CPS mirrors that of the UK government’s National Cyber Security 
Strategy 2016-21,5 resulting in a broad definition of cyber criminality encompassing not only 
de facto computer crime but also “traditional” criminality that involves the use of a digital or 
cyber element in its commission. As Karyda and Mitrou identify: 
 
A cybercrime is an electronic crime that is perpetrated using the Internet, or a crime whose 
“crime scene” is the Internet. Cybercrimes are not necessarily new crimes; many cases 
involve rather classic types of crimes where criminals exploit computing power and 
accessibility to information.6  
 
It is this definition of cybercrime that we have adopted for the purposes of this article, 
although we shall sometimes use synonyms such as “on-line-crime”, “internet-crime” or 
“digital crime”. This covers the regulation and/or supervision of the police response to crime 
on the clear and the dark web, to “new crimes” that can only be committed by digital means 
and traditional crimes that are “enhanced” by the use of digital devices. There is a 
considerable body of literature about how and why such criminality poses a new challenge 
for police and the criminal justice system, and also on whether police and criminal justice 
institutions are sufficiently resourced and competent to meet these challenges.7 This article is 
concerned with whether current procedural and evidential frameworks provide sufficient 
checks and balances, and with the development of systems, strategies to ensure that the 
regulation of policing in cyber space is fit for purpose. The question will be answered through 
analysis of the relevant structures, procedures and policies for policing cybercrime and the 
digital environment in England and Wales and the Netherlands. 
A comparison with the Netherlands could provide some interesting insights. We may 
expect a number of problems to be the same (indeed, the definition of cybercrime in the 
Netherlands is practically identical, although not always clearly distinguished from 
 
2 See Brants, Johnson and Wilson in this issue for the background to this research. 
3 See e.g. D.S. Wall, Cybercrimes: The transformation of crime in the information age, (Polity: Cambridge, 
2007). 
4 https://www.cps.gov.uk/cyber-online-crime  
5 HM Government, National Cyber-Security Strategy 2016-2021, (HM Government: London, 2016) 17. 
6 M. Karyda & L. Mitrou, Internet Forensics: Legal and Technical Issues (2007) Proceedings of the Second 
International Workshop on Digital Forensics and Incident Analysis (Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers: New York, 2007) 4. 
7 See also Davies in this issue. 
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“computer crime”); however, regulatory structures differ significantly. Unlike England and 
Wales, the Netherlands has one national police force, which should make the development of 
compatible technological capability easier, and also the consequential adaptation of a 
common operational practice to engage in cybercrime-policing in a lawful and ethical 
manner. It also has a longstanding legal culture in which centralised policy and guidance on 
the use of police powers play an important part in the criminal justice system. Both of these 
aspects – or rather the lack of them – are cited by British police as hampering the 
development of efficient online policing.8 But before we come to a comparison, we must first 
set out the scale of cybercrime, the structures of cyber-policing and the rules by which cyber-
policing is currently governed. We make no pretence at an encyclopaedic overview of all the 
problems and proposed solutions, or of all the official documents that set out policies and 
strategies in both countries; the amount alone suggests how important cybercrime has become 
as a policy issue. Indeed, for the Netherlands many documents are not publicly available.9  
 
Cyber-policing: A growing challenge 
 
Cybercrime is a major and developing criminal justice consideration. In 2018, UK and Dutch 
citizens self-reported broadly similar degrees of awareness of cybercrime risks and direct 
experience of crimes such as phishing, on-line fraud and hacking, in some instances and 
especially for awareness, well above the EU 26 average.10 This is reflected in the significance 
of cybercrime within crime and security strategies in both countries. 
The Crime Survey for England and Wales for the year ending March 201711 identified 
that, of the 3.4 million incidents of fraud experienced by adults that year, over half (57%; 1.9 
million incidents) were cyber-related. In addition, adults experienced an estimated 1.8 million 
incidents of (criminal) computer misuse; around two-thirds (66%; 1.2 million incidents) of 
these were computer virus-related and around one-third (34%; 0.6 million incidents) were 
related to unauthorised access to personal information (including hacking). Just how this 
compares to the Netherlands is not easy to say as Dutch statistics make different distinctions. 
In any event, in 2018, 8.5% of internet users older than 12 (about 1.2 million people) declared 
they had been a victim of digital crime in the previous 12 months. The most frequent type of 
crime was financial, although 1.8% concerned the victims of hacking and more than 2% had 
experienced personal threats, stalking or sexual victimisation. Just over 1% suffered identity 
theft or fraud.12 A recent study by the Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law 
Enforcement (NSCR) also found that the victim-impact of on-line crimes, be they stalking, 
bank-fraud or identity theft, is as high as – and usually even higher than – off-line 
criminality.13 No wonder then that policy and consultation documents in both countries 
identify developing strategies to combat cybercrime or cyber-enabled crime as a key 
 
8 Attempts to address fragmented organisation were noted during empirical research, including Chatham House 
Rule NPCC organised conferences on 22-25 October 2018 and 19-21 November 2019, and at a research project 
organised multi-professional workshop held on 12 June 2019 when significant differences in approach between 
forces were identified as a problem. 
9 However, see for a very detailed, though no longer entirely up to date, paper on the situation in the 
Netherlands, A.M.G. Smit (2013), Criminal law on cyber-crime in the Netherlands AIDP Country Report 
Section 4 < http://www.penal.org/sites/default/files/files/RH-11.pdf > last accessed 7 May 2020. 
10 EC, Special Eurobarometer 480: Europeans’ attitudes towards Internet security (EC: Brussels, 2019) 25 and 
27. 
11 ONS, The Crime Survey for England and Wales for the year ending March 2017 (ONS: Newport, 2017). 
12 Central Bureau of Statistics Report ‘Digitale veligheid en criminaliteit’ [Digital security and crime]: 
https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/media/com_hsd/report/249/document/veiligheid-en-criminaliteit.pdf > 
last accessed 7 May 2020. 
13NSCR, Gevolgen cybercrime zeer ingrijpend voor slachtoffers < https://www.nscr.nl/gevolgen-cybercrime-
zeer-ingrijpend-voor-slachtoffers/ > last accessed on 7 May 2020. 
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priority,14 while in the Netherlands, cybercrime features large on the research agenda of the 
Dutch Police Academy.15 
The growth of cyber-criminality is, per definition, not a national or regional 
phenomenon. Europol’s 2019 Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 
highlighted the “persistence and tenacity of a number of key threats”16 in respect of cyber-
criminality across the European Union and beyond. The extra-jurisdictional nature of the 
internet and the ease of global digital communication and data storage often add an 
international element to investigations, evidence gathering and prosecutions carried out by 
national criminal justice authorities. At the same time, the increasingly ubiquitous nature of 
digital devices in society poses significant challenges for law enforcement agencies and the 
wider criminal justice system, including inter alia the amount, complexity and reliability of 
digital evidence collected and the way in which such evidence is interpreted, stored and 
disclosed.  
Other aspects of cybercrime and “cyber-policing” that compound the difficulties are: 
the transnational nature of the internet, so that the devices through which crimes are 
committed may be situated in another country and are therefore not within the usual 
jurisdictional reach of national law enforcement agencies; the fact that online policing 
requires certain (new) competences and skills; that it almost inevitably entails a breach of the 
privacy of the person using the device; and that in the interests of the investigation (and 
future investigations) it is important that (the nature of) police activity remains hidden, while 
different countries have different laws governing such undercover policing, making 
international police co-operation difficult.17  
While on-line investigation very often implies covert investigation, the regulations 
and case law governing such policing were mostly drawn up before the advent of cybercrime 
and the internet, and it maybe unclear as to whether they can be adapted to fit on-line 
policing. This applies to both the UK and the Netherlands. No wonder then too, that the 
police are uncertain as to what they can actually do during on-line investigations: do they, for 
example need authorisation to interfere with a device (possibly in another country), from 
whom, for which activities and at what point? What are the consequences of failing to obtain 
authorisation? How to cooperate with law enforcement agencies in other countries and to 
make sure that evidence they may have obtained there, according to their own rules, is valid 
 
14  See, for example, Home Office, Cyber Crime Strategy, (Cm 7842, 2010), HM Government, above, n. 5; 
DDCMS and the Home Office, Online Harms White Paper, (CP 57, 2019). For the Netherlands: most recently 
Security Agenda 2019-2022, Parliamentary records IIK, r 2018–2019, 28 684, nr. 54; and Opsporing, 
vervolging en verstoring van cybercriminaliteit; cybercrime onderzoeksagenda, the cybercrime research agenda 
of the WODC (the government’s independent crime research centre), part of the wider national research agenda 
Cybersecurity beeld Nederland 2018, produced by the Nationaal Coördinator terrorismebestrijding en veiligheid 
(NCTV):   < https://www.nctv.nl/documenten/publicaties/2018/06/13/cybersecuritybeeld-nederland-2018 > last 
accessed 7 May 2020. 
15 The research agenda of the Dutch Police Academy comprises eight themes. The first is called “What is 
coming towards us?” and is about technological developments. The second one is “Police in connection with 
neighbourhood-web-world”. Number four is “State of the art technology and intelligence”. In other words: 3 out 
of 8 themes are directly concerned with the digitization of society. This too is a sign that police capacity (and 
money) is being assigned to questions in the sphere of digital developments. Next, in the national “Agenda for 
the development of local police care” the first task for the police is described as “Doing police work in 
neighbourhood and web”. See < 
https://www.politieacademie.nl/kennisenonderzoek/Onderzoek/onderzoekers/Documents/19193%20190911%20
DEF%20Strategische%20onderzoeksagenda%20Boek%20B5%20DIGI.PDF > last accessed 7 May 2020. 
16 Europol, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2019, (Europol & EC3 (European 
Cybercrime Centre), The Hague, 2019) 6. 
17 See Davies in this issue, on the problems arising from police international cooperation when procedural 
safeguards vary significantly between jurisdictions. 
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in the national courts? Is there sufficient guidance and are there clear policies available? And 
where can they be found?  
Worries about lawfulness and legitimacy by no means form a problem specific to UK 
or Dutch policing. In the United States, it appears that not only the police but also the courts 
struggle with such questions, while different courts have given different answers.18 In the 
Netherlands too, where many policy documents have highlighted the necessity of developing 
the potential of digital investigation,19 police have problems in knowing how to adapt 
concepts of covert policing developed in the 1990’s , to their on-line investigative activities, 
despite the existence of fairly detailed guidance and case law for undercover policing in the 
“real” world. They have called for more detailed legislation and instructions to enable them 
to know what is and what isn’t legitimate policing on-line.20 
 
The “structure” of cyber policing  
 
Cyber-policing may seem more complicated than its “real-world” counterpart, but it is still 
policing and, as such, covers the usual aspects of what that concept implies: maintaining law 
and order and addressing security and safety issues of the population and the state by 
investigating and bringing criminals to justice; securing (reliable) evidence of crimes; 
identifying threats, perpetrators and victims; prosecution, deterrence, disruption and 
prevention; all the while ensuring that such activities do not unduly infringe on individual 
civil rights and freedoms. These are the goals of police forces in every (democratic) country, 
but the way they attain them can be very different. It is often said that understanding 
differences in substantive and procedural laws is essential to international police cooperation, 
or, put another way, that they hinder effective cooperation and may lead criminals to engage 
in forum-shopping. Indeed, the foreword of a recent report of the Internet & Jurisdiction 
Policy Network postulated that; “[h]ow to handle the coexistence of heterogeneous laws on 
the cross-border internet is one of the greatest policy challenges of the digital 21st century.”21 
There is some evidence that police also go on shopping sprees, this time to find the 
jurisdiction most favourable to certain activities that are forbidden in their own country.22 
However, more important perhaps than knowing what the differences are is to understand the 
underlying ideology of policing – the generally accepted concept in a given country of what 
the police are and should be and do – that informs the differences in the laws that govern 
policing and its organisational structure.  
 In terms of historical origins, a traditional – and very biased – view of the difference 
between policing in England and Wales and on the Continent has it, in the words of C.H. 
Reith that “Gendarmerie police have normally depended for their power on their ability to 
inspire fear by the tyrannical practices which they are allowed to exercise. In most countries 
where they function they are regarded by the public without respect or admiration, and with 
contempt and dislike, but they have usually succeeded in providing an effective solution to 
 
18 M. R. Shillito, Untangling the ‘Dark Web’: an emerging technological challenge for the criminal law (2019), 
Information & Communications Technology Law, 28:2: 202-203 and S.D. Brown, ‘Hacking for evidence: the 
risks and rewards of deploying malware in pursuit of justice’ (2020) 20 ERA Forum:428. 
19 See n.15. 
20 W. Stol & L. Strikwerda, Online vergaren van informatie voor opsporingsonderzoek. Een beknopte evaluatie 
van voorgestelde wetgeving (2018), Tijdschrift voor Veiligheid (17) 1-2: 8-22. 
21 D. Svantesson, Internet and Jurisdiction: Global Status Report 2019 - Key Findings, (Internet and Jurisdiction 
Policy Network: Paris, 2019) 2. 
22 See Davies in this issue, on the problems of police participating in criminal offences, i.c. uploading images of 
the sexual abuse of children, which is forbidden in most but not all jurisdictions, but is usually a prerequisite of 
the undercover policing of child abuse sites. 
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the problem of enforcing laws in spite of their manifest defects”.23 In contrast, British 
policing is seen as “a model of a democratic and civil police that performs its tasks in strong 
agreement with the people”.24 Such notions underlie the traditional dichotomy of policing by 
consent (UK) versus policing by power (the Continent) – the citizen police, of and for the 
people, versus the police as the long arm of the state. As Fijnaut points out,25 this is a 
caricature, based on 19th Century prejudice towards all things French/Napoleonic (and 
therefore nasty) and equally mythical views of peaceful, democratic England and her citizen 
police force with its autonomous constabulary and style of community policing. In reality, 
“the history of the provincial police forces in England […] testifies to less harmony, 
consensus, and agreement with the people than Reith probably could have believed. The 
work of C. Steedman, Policing the Victorian Community, is a clear piece of supporting 
evidence for this view”.26 In any event, particularly in the past decades, British policing has 
come much closer to its Continental counterpart: partly because of the advent of the CPS and 
legislation governing (the use of) police powers, partly as a consequence of the harmonizing 
tendencies of the European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms with its case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
and, again, in part due to years of cooperation in Europol and Eurojust.  
 Nevertheless, historical distinctions still play a part in the differences between 
policing in England and Wales and the Netherlands. The general organisation of the Dutch 
police has always been that of an armed state force (Reith’s despised “gendarmerie”), which, 
although regionalised until recently, is now one centralised police force. Its power – and 
therefore potential for destructiveness – is mitigated by its relative lack of autonomous 
powers and subordination in criminal matters to the Dutch Prosecution Service and, in the 
final event as required by the principles of Rechtstaat, to the law and oversight by the courts. 
This means that, as far as the exercise of police powers is concerned, the police may only act, 
i.e. infringe on citizens’ freedoms, if their actions are necessary and proportionate, and 
specifically authorised by law. The Dutch Police Act, which conveys policing powers to 
maintain law and order, is regarded as too generally worded. This is also the position of the 
ECtHR. Wielding powers or using methods that have no basis in law of sufficient specificity 
(be it written or case law) is unlawful policing.  
By contrast, in England and Wales, the autonomous constabulary has evolved into 
territorial police forces whose chief constables have considerable autonomous power, while 
the CPS has no formal authority over police activities. As in the USA, the idea of the citizen 
police is reflected in the notion that the police may do whatever anyone else may do as long 
as it is not forbidden – a position increasingly limited by legislation governing police 
investigations such as the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984, the Criminal 
Procedure and Investigations Act (CPIA) 1996, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
(RIPA) 2000, the Investigatory Powers Act (IPA) 2016, such regulation being required by the 
principles enunciated by the ECHR. Successive scandals arising out of miscarriages of 
justice, were needed as a catalyst, 27 however, for even such limited codification of police 
powers. Such historical cultural differences are relevant to how different criminal justice 
systems respond to social and economic change, such as the emergence of cybercrime. 
 
23  . H.C. Reith, The Blind Eye of History (Faber and Faber: London,.1952). 
24 C. Fijnaut, The police and the public in western Europe: a precarious comparison (1990) 63 Police Journal 
337-345. 
25 Ibid. 339. 
26 Ibid., where Steedman is referenced as: Steedman, C., Policing the Victorian Community (Routledge and 
Kegan Paul: London, 1984). 
27 C. Walker, ‘Miscarriages of Justice in Principle and Practice’ in and K. Starmer (eds.), Miscarriages of 
Justice: A Review of Justice in Error (Blackstone Press: London, 1999) 45-52 and 61-62. 
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Whereas the civil law system of Continental Europe puts its trust in the codification of legal 
principles and regards the state (and its functionaries) as bound by the ensuing written laws, 
which renders it slow to be able to respond to change, the preference in common law 
England, even in relation to fundamental principles, is for the law to be developed by 
reference to the issues raised in a particular case rather than risk future inflexibility and 
inappropriateness.28 This pragmatism has its disadvantages, where flexibility and the means 
to quickly develop appropriate rules also mean uncertainty as to what the law actually says 
and its proper application. 
 Policing the digital world, and in particular the dark web, often requires the use of 
covert methods that infringe on fundamental rights (privacy, freedom of expression). In the 
Netherlands where all police action requires a specific basis in law, undercover policing is 
strictly regulated in detail in the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) and is, moreover, 
governed by (policy) directives from the Prosecution Service; the problem for Dutch police is 
to know what these regulations mean for cyber-policing. This is also true of England and 
Wales, where the investigative process is underpinned by a series of authorisations necessary 
for the deployment of intrusive powers for example, directed surveillance, search of premises 
and seizure of evidence and so called “equipment interference”. Police power to exercise 
such intrusive powers may be derived from a range of statutory authorities (PACE 1984, 
RIPA 2000, IPA 2016 etc.) depending on the particular power being exercised. Here, 
however, detailed guidance seems less available, and the uncertainty seems to be which rules 
are activated by which activity. This is compounded by the lack of centralised organisation 
characteristic of UK policing, which like the US model consist of ‘highly diversified 
tapestries of local, regional and national with complex inter-relationships’.29  
 
Policing Cybercrime: organisation in England and Wales 
Policing in England and Wales has a traditionally devolved structure with 43 territorial police 
forces in England and Wales30, each covering a specified geographical area31. The National 
Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC)32 brings together senior officers from all police force areas 
and is responsible for coordination and reform of policing at a national level. Overall 
responsibility for policing policy rests with the Home Office; however, responsibility for 
responding to aspects of cybercrime will be shared with other departments, on-line abuse for 
example also falling within the remit of the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and 
Sport.33  
The National Crime Agency34 (NCA) was formed in 2013 as a national law enforcement 
agency responsible for coordinating the policing of organised crime across the UK.35 The 
NCA is not a separate police force but instead is a non-ministerial government department 
accountable to the Home Secretary who is responsible for directing the strategic priorities of 
the NCA36. Although the NCA has a power to direct police operations (with the Home 
Secretary’s consent) it tends to work collaboratively with territorial police forces and other 
agencies under a series of voluntary arrangements to coordinate responses to the threat of 
 
28 See e.g., Lord Bingham, The Rule of Law (Allen Lane: London, 2010) 7-8. 
29 B. Bowling, R. Reiner and J. Sheptycki, The Politics of the Police, 5th Edn (OUP: Oxford, 2019) 246. 
30 < https://www.police.uk/forces/> accessed 7 May 2020; Police Act 1996 (as amended), Schedule 1. 
31 In addition to the territorial police forces there are 4 ‘special’  police forces; the British Transport Police, the 
Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the Ministry of Defence Police and The Port of Dover Police. 
32 < http://www.npcc.police.uk/Home.aspx > accessed 7 May 2020. 
33 See e.g. DDCMS and the Home Office, above n.14. 
34 .< http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/ > accessed 7 May 2020. 
35 Crime and Courts Act 2013, c.22, s.1. 
36 Ibid. s.3. 
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organised crime. The NCA also houses the National Cyber Crime Unit37, which is 
responsible for leading the UK’s response to cyber-crime threats. 
The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)38 was launched in October 2016 as 
“a single point of contact for SMEs, larger organisations, government agencies, the general 
public and departments”.39 The NCSC was established under the UK Government’s National 
Cyber Security Strategy 2016 - 202140 “to be the authority on the UK’s cyber security 
environment, sharing knowledge, addressing systemic vulnerabilities (sic) and providing 
leadership on key national cyber security issues.”41 Whilst the NCSC’s remit is broader than 
law enforcement, it is required to “work collaboratively with other law enforcement, defence, 
the UK’s intelligence and security agencies and international partners.”42  
At a regional level, thirteen Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCUs) provide “a 
range of specialist policing capabilities”43 to territorial police forces. These ROCUs work in 
partnership with the NCA and NCSC to support and coordinate investigations into organised 
crime, including cybercrime. Whilst each territorial force sets its own strategic policing 
priorities in collaboration with their local Policing and Crime Commissioner, the ROCUs 
provide a conduit between locally led investigations and NCA supported operations at a 
regional, national or international level.  
 
Policing Cybercrime in The Netherlands  
Since January 1st 2013, the Dutch police have been (re)organised into one national police 
force with, at the national level, one police management team and one chief of police, 
accountable to the minister of Security and Justice (who is, in turn, accountable to 
Parliament). This national force is divided into ten regional units, each with their own unit 
management and dealing with high impact crimes, the most serious cases going to units at the 
national level. Regional units are subdivided into districts (again subdivided into basic teams 
which deal with relatively simple, frequently occurring crimes). There are 43 districts in total 
and 168 basic teams. There is also one central, national unit designed for transregional and 
specialist policing, with various services, of which the National Investigation Service is 
engaged in the fight against serious and organised crime and other serious crimes such as 
child pornography and “high tech crime”.44  
The Team High Tech Crime (NTHTC) plays an important part in cyber-policing at 
the national level and is charged with investigating the most difficult cyber-cases (i.e. 
internationally organised or politically sensitive cybercrime).45 But it is not the only unit 
involved, as digital crime is also dealt with at the regional and local level.46 As of 2016-2017, 
the police were engaged in setting up “cybercrime teams” at a regional level, who also 
support colleagues at the local level in need of extra, specialised and/or technical knowledge. 
Some of the regional units have so-called “digital platforms” that function as front-line digital 
support for investigative teams and officers. The organisational structure differs per regional 
unit and is still very much a matter of ongoing development.   
 
37 < https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/what-we-do/crime-threats/cyber-crime > accessed 7 May 2020. 
38 < https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/ > last accessed 7 May 2020. 
39  < https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/about-ncsc/what-we-do > last accessed 2 January 2020. 
40 HM Government, above n. 5. 
41 Ibid. para 1.9. 
42 < https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/about-ncsc/what-we-do > last accessed 2nd January 2020. 
43 < https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/information/regional-organised-crime-units-rocus > last accessed 2nd January 
2020. 
44 See W. Stol and L. Strikwerda, Law Enforcement in Digital Society: (Eleven International Publishing, The 
Hague, 2019) 237-239, for a more elaborate description and schematic overview. 
45 See Davies in this issue for more on the role of the NTHTC. 
46 Again see Stol and Strikwerda, above n. 44 at 247-256, for detailed explanation. 
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There is however a tendency to specifically prioritise and organise the fight against 
certain forms of cybercrime. In 2011, the Programme for Improving the Combatting of Child 
Pornography47 resulted in a team for tackling child pornography and child sex tourism at the 
national level and through ten regional teams, with centralised prioritisation and allocation of 
cases. If necessary, the NTHTC can provide technical support, while a “Dark web-team” 
deals with investigations on the dark web. There is also an Electronic Crime Task Force 
(ECTF), in which the police, the Prosecution Service and the banks collaborate to prepare 
online fraud cases before handing them over to a regional unit. The National Internet Fraud 
Hotline receives reports from citizens about online fraud, assesses them, prepares the 
investigation and again hands over to a regional team. Finally, the National programme to 
Intensify Tackling Cybercrime supports the police in implementing the Ministry of Security 
and Justice’s 2015-2018 Security Agenda in relation to cybercrime prevention. 
According to Stol and Strikwerda, the organisation of cybercrime-policing in the 
Netherlands is still in a transitional phase, with current organisational measures merely 
temporary. These authors foresee that the idea of organisation at three levels (national, 
regional, local) may disappear in the face of centralisation and thematic organisation (the 
current backbone of police work, neighbourhood policing, becoming simply one more theme 
among many, including child pornography and identity fraud).48 Increasingly too, 
centralisation is required for international cooperation, with other police forces and with 
Europol and Interpol; at present, this is the remit of the NTHTC. At the same time, Stol and 
Strikwerda predict that (the fight against) cybercrime will cease to be a specialism, and that 
now “specialised” units will once again take their place in the normal fight against crime. All 
of which is not to say that specialised technical knowledge will no longer be required, or that 
policing cyberspace does not bring extra complications.  
  
 
The challenges of implementing coherent cyber policing polices: setting strategic priorities 
 
As discussed above, while many types of cybercrime (particularly in respect of cyber-enabled 
crime) are not new per se, the technological, transnational and extra jurisdictional nature of 
cybercrime makes it difficult to fit into traditional policing paradigms. This is compounded 
by the subsumption of cyber-policing within a more general cyber-security narrative. Whilst 
Lavorgna and Sergi identify that “it is not surprising that cybercrime is receiving increasing 
attention… at the policy level”49 there appear to be challenges in setting specific strategic 
priorities and policies for policing in this area in the UK, particularly at the local or regional 
level.  
The basis of UK cybercrime policy is outlined in the 2010 Home Office Cyber Crime 
Strategy50 (the 2010 strategy) and latterly the UK Government’s National Cyber Security 
Strategy 2016 – 2021 (the 2016 strategy).51 The five overarching aims of the 2010 strategy 
are to:  
 Coordinate activity across Government to tackle crime and address security on the 
internet in line with the strategic objectives laid out in the UK Cyber Security 
Strategy;  
 
47 Parliamentary Papers, IIK 2010/11, 32500 VI, no. 102. 
48 Stol and Strikwerda, above n. 44 at 259. 
49 A. Lavorgna and A. Sergi, Serious, therefore Organised? A Critique of the Emerging “Cyber-Organised 
Crime” Rhetoric in the United Kingdom, (2016) 10 International Journal of Cyber Criminology 175.  
50 Home Office, above n.14.  
51 HM Government, above n. 5. 
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 reduce the direct harms by making the internet a hostile environment for financial 
criminals and child sexual predators, and ensuring that they are unable to operate 
effectively through work to disrupt crime and prosecute offenders;  
 raise public confidence in the safety and security of the internet, not only through 
tackling crime and abuse, but through the provision of accurate and easy-to-
understand information to the public on the threats;  
 support industry leadership to tackle cybercrime, and work with industry to consider 
how products and online services can be made safer and security products easy to use; 
[and to]  
 work with international partners to tackle the problem collectively.52 
 
It is noteworthy that the 2010 strategy situates cybercrime within its broader cyber-security 
context. This appears to be consistent with what Lavorna and Sergi consider to be “the 
emergence of a non-evidence-based “cyber-organised crime” rhetoric”53. This becomes even 
more explicit when considered alongside the 2016 strategy. The 2016 strategy deals with 
cybercrime as one of a number of potential cyber security threats, largely in the context of 
threats from organised crime groups (OCGs) and foreign actors, predicated on the wider 
threat to national security and infrastructure.54 
  The UK’s 2016 strategy does recognise that “[w]hilst OCGs may pose a significant 
threat to our collective prosperity and security, equally of concern is the continuing threat 
from acts of less sophisticated but widespread cybercrimes carried out against individuals or 
smaller organisations.55 The 2016 strategy further considers that “[t]he primary duty of the 
Government is to defend the country from attacks by other states, to protect citizens and the 
economy from harm, and to set the domestic and international framework to protect our 
interests, safeguard fundamental rights, and bring criminals to justice.”56  
In the UK at least, it appears that a key challenge in cyber policing policy and the 
setting of strategic priorities in this area derives in part from the structure of policing in 
England and Wales. Outside of the larger, more heavily resourced investigations into cyber-
crime, typically prioritised because of the broader cyber security threat that they pose and 
typically coordinated by the NCA, it is less clear how the police in England and Wales tackle 
the more general threat of cybercrime in a coordinated way. Bodies such as Action Fraud57 
provide a role in identifying the scope of the problem faced and provide a central point of 
contact for reporting of these issues but in practice do little more than record instances of 
online fraud and coordinate the dissemination of reports to relevant police forces. At a local 
level, and in the context of finite resources, individual territorial police forces to a large 
extent set their own strategic priorities. At the very least this makes it difficult to identify a 
coordinated approach to the growing general threat of cyber criminality beyond the larger, 
more coordinated operations against perceived threats to national security or infrastructure or 
which are part of efforts to tackle more sophisticated and organised criminal offending. 
In the Netherlands too, government policy (as set out in the government coalition 
agreement of 2012)58 recognises “increasing threats and vulnerabilities in the field of 
 
52 Ibid at at17. 
53 A. Lavorgna and A. Sergi, above n. 49 at 171. 
54. HM Government, above n.5.  
55 Ibid. at para 3.6. 
56 Ibid at para 4.9. 
57  < https://www.actionfraud.police.uk/ > ;last accessed 5 April 2020. 
58 < https://www.europa-
nu.nl/9353000/1/j4nvih7l3kb91rw_j9vvj9idsj04xr6/vj46ifemvrmj/f=/regeerakkoord_vvd_pvda_2012.pdf > last 
accessed 7 May 2020. 
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cybersecurity”. These are to be met through joining forces with all stakeholders, reinforcing 
investigative capacity and adapting legal instruments to changed circumstances”.  At the 
same time, one of the important recent Dutch policy documents was released by the National 
Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism and Security, pointing here too to a wider security 
approach. However, the traditional role of the heads of the prosecution service in 
implementing criminal justice policy and directing prosecutors (and in their wake the police) 
by means of binding directives perhaps makes the development of coherent policing policies 
easier in the Netherlands, can cut through political rhetoric and establish cybercrime as a 
matter of “normal” policing.  
 
 
The Netherlands: supervision of police action and legal requirements  
Most readers of this article will be unfamiliar with the governance of Dutch policing and how 
this is directly derived from the nature of criminal justice in the Netherlands. The same 
considerations apply to England and Wales where, for example,  the emphasis on disclosure 
and admissibility of evidence that will be considered in the next section, reflects essential fair 
trial safeguards arising directly out of the requirement of equality of arms in the adversarial 
style of procedure; there, the trial phase is paramount and provides the only arena in which 
the case, including police activity and the manner of evidence collection and its reliability, 
can be (con)tested in adversarial argument. This also means that, if a case is not prosecuted 
and thereby disclosure requirements set in motion (for example, if the goal of police activity 
is simply to disrupt the activities of the offender), there will be very little regulated scrutiny 
of police action. By contrast, the continental-style of policing and inquisitorial procedure in 
the Netherlands, with its emphasis on pre-trial investigation and the importance of 
hierarchical oversight to ensure legitimate policing in accordance with the law, requires very 
different safeguards.59 The most important could be said to be the role of the prosecutor and 
the court in scrutinising police investigative activity as to whether it conforms to legal 
requirements. These are to be found in the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) and, given that 
legislation can be unwieldy in that it may take a long time to amend to fit changing 
circumstances, in directives from the heads of the prosecution service that clarify and 
elaborate on the legal provisions. Such directives have the status of quasi law, are public and 
binding on prosecutors and police, and may be relied upon as a defence in court. 
Traditionally they form an important aspect of Dutch criminal justice,60 and also play a role 
in cyber-policing.  
The Explanatory Memorandum to the new Computer Crime Act III (p. 16 and 
following) refers explicitly to the Prosecution Directive on police powers of investigation61 
which in its turn gives detailed instructions on how to use the powers set out in the Act on 
Special Police Powers (Wet Bijzondere opsporingsbevoegdheden) and which is contained in 
Book 1 Title IVA CCP. The regulation of these special powers was the direct result of the 
police exceeding their authority in the 1990’s with regard to the policing of organised crime 
by using covert methods of investigation not regulated by law, article 3 of the Police Act, 
which confers general powers, being regarded as too non-specific. The resulting scandal is 
indicative of how deeply engrained in the Netherlands is the notion that the police must only 
 
59 See C.H. Brants, ‘Comparing criminal process as part of legal culture’, in Comparative Criminal Justice and 
Globalisation (ed. D. Nelken), (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2011): 49-68. 
60 See on the importance of such directives for criminal justice policy and the setting of proecution and police 
priorities: E Blankenburg, Beleid – a very Dutch legal term (1999) 30 Journal of legal pluralism and unofficial 
law 65-74. 
61 Aanwijzing opsporingsbevoegdheden (2014A009), ch. 2, 3 < https://beleidsregels.om.nl/opsporing-
politie/aanwijzing > last accessed 7 May 2020. 
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use powers conferred by law and must do so under guidance of the public prosecutor. Acting 
partly in coordination with the American Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) as part of the 
latter’s “war on drugs”, some regional Dutch forces engaged in undercover policing using 
methods such as controlled delivery and participating agents that were perfectly normal and 
legal in the USA but, at the time, had no basis in Dutch law. Some, though not all, 
prosecutors were unaware of what was going on and in some cases the police used the money 
obtained through participation and controlled delivery to buy supplies for their own forces. 
When the scandal broke in the media it was framed as the police being “out of control.” This 
was followed by a parliamentary inquiry (a particularly thorough and public way of 
investigating public scandal in the Netherlands). The result was a large body of legislation 
that details what the police can do in undercover work and binds them to seek authorisation 
from the prosecutor or judge of instruction and to scrupulously record whatever they have 
done in the course of a covert investigation.62 
As we have seen, much cyber-policing is covert policing (and often also concerns 
organised crime) and the Dutch government obviously regard these laws and directives, 
which are at least 15 years old, as adaptable to the policing of cybercrime. Interestingly, 
although the Computer Crime Act III with its explicit reference to the Directive on Special 
Powers entered into force in March 2019, as yet the Prosecution Service has not updated that 
directive or produced new instructions on how to translate it from the real world to the world 
of cyberspace; notwithstanding that lack of training for working in a digital environment and 
lack of knowledge regarding the ins and outs of cyber-policing are cited as two distinct 
problems for the Dutch police.63 Such guidance as does exist has usually not taken the form 
of official directives and is, moreover, not publicly available, which, given the status of 
policy directives as quasi-law, is unusual. These include “Half Uur Internetbevraging” 
(HUIB) [“Half an hour on the Internet”] which is a document that shows police officers how 
to systematically and efficiently (no more than half an hour) collect information from the 
internet. And a document that shows police officers what legislation can or must be used (i.e. 
which police powers) for what kind of internet search. 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Computer Crime Act III attempts to rectify this 
lack of official guidance, by setting out how some existing special powers are to be used in 
cyber-policing. They have in common that, as soon as the infringement of civil rights is at 
stake, their use requires authorisation from either the Prosecutor or the judge of instruction 
(investigating magistrate). The rule of thumb is proportionality and necessity: suspicion of a 
(very) serious crime, while the more serious the infringement, the greater the need for 
authorisation and the higher and more independent the authorising authority (the judge of 
instruction being a member of the independent judiciary, while the prosecutor may often be 
either close to or involved in the investigation). In the case of covert surveillance, for 
example, no authorisation from the prosecutor is required unless such surveillance entails 
entering premises (not being a home) and/or becomes systematic, by which is meant an 
attempt to obtain a complete picture of a person’s life.  
The Computer Crime Act III introduces what it calls the power to investigate in and 
interfere with an “automated device” (by which we should understand hacking a computer, 
smartphone, indeed anything with a digital processor). It explains that the possible 
infringement of privacy that this could imply, in combination with systematic surveillance 
(total examination of the content of said device or placing police malware such as a crawler), 
 
62 See Parlementaire enquête opsporingsmethoden, IRT (1994-1996) < 
https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhrpmxw6/parlementaire_enquete_opsporingsmethoden > last accessed 7 
May 2020.. 
63 W. Stol, R. Leukfeldt and H. Klap, ‘Policing a Digitized Society’ in: Cybercrime and the Police in W.P. Stol 
and J. Jansen (eds.), (Eleven Publishing: The Hague, 2013). 
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constitutes such an infringement of individual privacy rights that police need to seek an order 
from the prosecutor and authorisation by the judge of instruction. However, despite detailed 
explanations, complete with examples, the Explanatory Memorandum does not, indeed 
cannot, cover all eventualities. Meanwhile, the police themselves have produced several 
“good practice guides”, or farmed the production out to academic research groups. In the 
final event, it will be up to the Prosecution Service to provide clear guidance. As yet, the only 
new prosecution directives on cybercrime concern the penalties that the prosecutor should ask 
for in court for different types of computer crimes64 and another novum of the Computer 
Crime Act III, which relinquishes territoriality as a criterion for determining jurisdiction and 
introduces the power to investigate and interfere with a device regardless of the state where it 
may be physically found.  
The Explanatory Memorandum contains a lengthy justification for this possible 
infringement of another state’s sovereignty, while the concomitant directive explains in detail 
what action the police and prosecutor should take if they wish to hack a computer, server, 
smartphone etc. of which the location is unknown or is in a state other than the Netherlands.65 
It also specifically instructs them to follow the usual route to obtain assistance from the 
authorities in the other country whenever time allows, or to inform that country later.66 
Similar provisions can be found in the United Kingdom in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
and in legislation passed in the United States of America where the Clarifying the Lawful 
Use of Data (CLOUD) Act67  allows for the interception and disclosure of electronic 
communications in specified circumstances, but regardless of jurisdictional niceties or the 
usual recourse to international assistance in criminal matters.  
In the Netherlands, prosecutorial and judicial oversight of the police is thought to 
ensure that special powers will be used lawfully, which means that any illegality should be 
discovered in advance by the prosecution, the defence or the court. Disclosure of evidence 
does not exist in the same way as in England and Wales and, indeed, is theoretically less 
important as a safeguard. Nevertheless, as will be considered in greater detail in the next 
section, defence and court must be aware of what has taken place during the investigation. 
Because of the paramount importance of pre-trial procedure in Dutch criminal process and 
the investigative role of the inquisitorial court, there is much less emphasis than in an 
adversarial system on adversarial debate or the equality of arms and disclosure regime that is 
meant to guarantee such debate. In normal, i.e. non-digital, circumstances in the Netherlands, 
procedural requirements dictate the existence of an extensive dossier in which all police 
activity, all methods used, handling and storage of evidence and warrants and authorisation 
obtained must be noted, and that forms the basis for the prosecution dossier. This can then be 
scrutinised by the defence before and by the court during trial, when the judges will have the 
full dossier to hand when preparing for and examining the case.  
However, access to the dossier, which must be through a request to the prosecutor, 
may be denied the defence “for reasons pertaining to the investigation”, such as secrecy with 
regard to police methods used etc. The defence do have an absolute right to access the dossier 
from the moment a summons to appear in court is issued. Although defence counsel play a 
less important part in inquisitorial than in adversarial proceedings, access to the dossier is 
crucial, and not only because Art. 6 ECHR regards it as part of the requirements of a fair trial 
(the right to know the evidence and to be able to contest it). Access to the dossier gives Dutch 
defence counsel an opportunity to point to gaps in the information it contains, to point the 
 
64 Richtlijn voor strafvordering cybercrime (2018R001), https://beleidsregels.om.nl/index/richtlijn-8 
65 Aanwijzing voor de internationale aspecten van de inzet van de bevoegdheid ex art. 126NBA SV,  < 
https://beleidsregels.om.nl/opsporing-politie/aanwijzing-0/ > accessed 7 May 2020. 
66 See Davies in this issue on the details of this police power to hack across borders. 
67 H.R.4943, 115th Congress (2017-2018). 
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prosecutor to alternative avenues of investigation, to request further investigation by the 
judge of instruction and to challenge the legality of the way the evidence was obtained.  
While there are significant gaps in and questions about the Dutch approach to creating 
a legal regime that is fit for the purpose of regulating the policing of cybercrime, the criminal 
justice system and political expectations about how it should work, are geared to respond to 
criminological changes in a unified and rights compliant manner. In England, as will be seen 
in the next section, the problems of a fragmented policing system are compounded by the 
generally slow, possibly reluctant, and more fragmented approach to modernising the law. 
 
England and Wales: supervision of police action  
Except for some specialists, it is often difficult to be confident of knowing the current English 
procedural law regulating the conduct of investigations. In contrast to a Dutch colleague, an 
English police officer cannot expect to be able to check the law easily in a single current text 
concerning criminal procedure or obtain guidance from easily referenced memoranda or 
directives. As indicated in the previous section, while this may not have always been fully 
achieved in the Netherlands, the cultural expectation is that it should be fully achievable. In 
England the default expectation among police officers observed in our research appears to be 
that the law and how it should be applied to cybercrime policing will be obscure or even 
threatening.68 This stems from several causes.  
The fragmented policing structure with significant disparities in resources and 
influence in England has already been noted and is clearly important. Other factors also 
contribute to this situation and are considered in this section: (i) the frequently piecemeal 
legal development via case law and (ii) the need to identify current statutory law by tracing a 
series of interlocked amendments made over several years in compendium type criminal 
justice statutes and, perhaps more controversially, (iii) the greater distance (in terms of the 
time taken and comprehensiveness of the response) between English law and supra-national 
fundamental rights jurisprudence. These issues are daily diet for both legal academics, judges 
and other practising lawyers who have been trained to understand how English law develops 
and how to apply it accurately. Even in the highly codified Dutch system, some questions of 
admissibility are left to judicial discretion, but some thought needs to be spared for the impact 
of legal complexity and uncertainty in England and Wales on investigators already struggling 
to cope with the volumes, complexities and novel ethical problems of cybercrime.69  
This is an extensive and complicated subject, and here we can only attempt provide a 
brief summary through four examples that bring out comparisons and similarities of approach 
between the Netherlands and England and see some advantage in being able to respond to 
technological challenges, noting the extent of  convergence of legal thinking across 
jurisdictions70, if not always in terms of the solution found then at least with some 
commonality in the underlying principles applicable to problem resolution: 
 Data protection in criminal investigations. 
 Disclosure of evidence. 
 The judicial regulation of the admissibility of evidence during a trial. 
 
68Noted during empirical research, including Chatham House Rule NPCC organised conferences on 22-25 
October 2018 and 19-21 November 2019, and at a research project organised multi-professional workshop held 
on 12 June 2019. 
64 The overall impact of cybercrime and rising volumes of digital evidence in traditional offences is 
acknowledged by Europol as ‘a threat to [police] capability to investigate such crimes and identify victims’, see: 
Europol, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) (Europol: The Hague, 2018) 31. As to ethical 
problems, see Davies in this issue on the question of whether police officers, acting as covert participating 
agents, should be allowed to commit crimes in order to safeguard their cover. 
70 For references to the differing perspectives on the ‘convergence thesis’ see P. Roberts and A. Zuckerman, 
Criminal Evidence, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010) n. 61 56. 
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 Centralised quasi-judicial supervision and judicially guided inspections of 
communication interception, surveillance and equipment inference (‘hacking’). 
 
It is important to bear in mind that, as will be seen below, sometimes the impact of the 
solution to one problem in the decentralised English criminal justice system and piecemeal 
nature of legal development may have important consequences for the ability to resolve other 
problems. 
 
a) Data protection  
Data protection law, partly because it is relatively new, and also because of its commercial 
importance, is a self-contained and clear area of legal regulation applicable to cybercrime 
policing. It provides, for example, rules governing the acquisition, use and retention of data 
relating to persons of interest and victims. In the Netherlands – irrespective of whether it 
originates in EU law/CJEU jurisprudence or is derived from ECHR/ECtHR – Dutch courts 
and the data protection authority must apply it directly and it will take precedence over 
national laws.71 Post-Brexit in England and Wales, data protection law may come to consist 
of EU law in force at the time of departure72 and an evolving system of ECHR law developed 
by ECtHR and applied indirectly through domestic legislation, especially the Human Rights 
Act 1998, and case law. 73 There will be strong commercial and security self-interests that 
might discourage the emergence of differences over data protection between English and EU 
law. That would mean that, just as issues are currently well understood and detailed official 
or private guidance is readily accessible for police officers, it is unlikely to cause difficulties 
in the future for the police in England, at least in the short and medium term. 
 
b) Disclosure  
In English and Welsh criminal proceedings a failure to disclose potentially exculpatory 
evidence to defence lawyers engages Art 6. ECHR. This is not an abstract principle. A former 
Director of Public Prosecutions admitted to Parliament that some people had been wrongly 
imprisoned because of such failures in the procedural safeguards intended to ensure that 
unreliable evidence can be exposed as such and contested during the trial.74 Disclosure 
problems are not new (they were highlighted in six reports between 2011 and 2017), nor 
confined to technological or scientific evidence.75 The widespread ownership and use of 
digital devices, “the explosion of digital media” often outside cybercrime investigations, 
however, has transformed the scale of the problem.76 It has been is estimated that an average 
of 35,000 pages of data can be downloaded from every single mobile device examined by 
police forces,77 that are also trying to cope with ever increasing volumes of cybercrime. 
 
71 I. Peçi, ‘The Netherlands’ in K. Ligeti (ed.) Towards a Prosecutor For the European Union (Hart: Oxford, 
2013) 96; J. Gerards and J. Fleuren, ‘The Netherlands’ in (eds.) J Gerards and J Fleuren, Implementation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and of the judgments of the ECtHR in national case law (Intersentia; 
Cambridge, 2014) 220-223. 
72 Initial post-Brexit guidance to criminal justice organisations (at the time of writing) is that except for minor 
technical amendments data protection law has not changed and Brexit did not affect day-to-day domestic 
processing. Also international exchanges with EU member states will not change if an ‘adequacy decision ‘is in 
place, see: ICO, Data Protection and Brexit Law enforcement processing: Five steps to take (ICO: Warrington, 
2019). 
73 R.Masterman, ‘The United Kingdom’, in (eds.) J Gerards and J Fleuren, Implementation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and of the judgments of the ECtHR in national case law (Intersentia; Cambridge, 
2014) 301-302 and 306-318. 
74 Justice Committee, Disclosure of evidence in criminal cases (HC 2017–19 859) para 1. 
75 Ibid. para 22. 
76 David Kirk, How do you solve a problem like disclosure? (2013) 77 J. Crim. L. 277.  
77 Justice Committee, above n. 74 para 56. 
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Prosecution and defence access - particularly during sexual offence investigations - to 
intimate aspects of offenders’ and victims’ lives preserved on social media, has also given 
political and public prominence to a problem that hitherto was the preserve of legal and 
police experts. 
In R v Malook78 the England and Wales Court of Appeal held that the duty to record 
applies to not only material evidence seized by the police during an investigation, but equally 
to “documentation produced by the police in the course of investigations in contradistinction 
to pre-existing material seized by a police force.” The court emphasised that “Proper record 
keeping in an investigation is essential to the integrity of an investigation, to public 
confidence in police investigations and the proper administration of justice.79 Responsibility 
for compliance with the law on disclosure80 is shared by the investigators (usually the 
relevant police force), who are responsible for logging the material which is obtained or 
generated by the investigation, and the CPS which is responsible for determining whether the 
evidence should be disclosed. 
The CPS have published Guidelines on Communications Evidence81 and subsequently 
guidance on what constitutes reasonable lines of enquiry82 primarily in response to the 
failures in disclosure in serious sexual offence cases83. Both sets of guidance have to be read 
in conjunction with the Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure,84 but it is difficult to 
see how these supplementary guidelines - even if there are no difficulties in dealing with 
three separate sources of advice - can have a significant impact without a consequent increase 
in resource for disclosure practices and, perhaps more significantly, consideration of the 
fitness for purpose of such a self-regulatory regime for disclosure compliance created before 
the proliferation of online investigations and digital evidence.  
In theory at least, the digital and cybercrime volume pressures faced by investigators 
in the Netherlands should not be so intense because the defence can seek to intervene earlier 
and significantly in the pre–trial proceedings. Once a suspect has been formally identified, 
the defence is entitled to see evidence as it is gathered (“added to the file” that will contain all 
the evidence on which the judicial determination will be based)85 and can request that 
additional matters are investigated.86 As outlined above, neither right is absolute. Access to 
the file can be restricted temporarily and additional investigations require judicial 
authorisation. A more pro-active role for the defence on something like the Dutch model 
might reduce the digital disclosure burden for the police as well as the risk of miscarriages of 
justice arising from disclosure failures. This however would be very difficult to adapt to an 
adversarial system where truth-finding depends on the autonomy of equal parties engaging in 
adversarial debate at trial. Moreover, in practice, Dutch defence lawyers complain that they 
do not see evidence in time because of how the police and prosecution control the flow of 
information. This has not, however, given rise to similar scandals that rocked confidence in 
the English and Welsh criminal justice system in 2018-19,87 although there has been at least 
 
78 R v Malook [2011] EWCA Crim 254. 
79 Ibid at [35]. 
80 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act (CPIA) 1996.  
81 < https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/disclosure-guidelines-communications-evidence, (published 26 
January 2018) > last accessed 6 March 2020. 
82 < https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/disclosure-guide-reasonable-lines-enquiry-and-communications-
evidence > (published 24 July 2018) last accessed 06/03/2020. 
83 Ibid. n. 88. 
84 Attorney General, Attorney General's Guidelines on Disclosure, 2013. 
85 I. Peçi, above n.71 at 96; J. Gerards and J. Fleuren, above n.71 at 220-223. 
86 M. C. Van Wijk, Cross-border evidence gathering (Eleven Publishing: The Hague, 2017) 137. 
87 Justice Committee, above n.74 at paras 85-86. 
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one major miscarriage of justice where the prosecution withheld evidence from both defence 
and court.88 
 If special investigating powers have been used in the Netherlands, a separate dossier 
outlining these and containing the relevant documents, prosecution orders and judicial 
authorisations may be presented. It should be remembered that the primary importance here is 
not disclosure to the defence in order to make equality of adversarial argument possible, but 
information for the court who must judge whether the investigation has taken place in 
accordance with the law and whether the evidence meets the requirements of quality, 
reliability and legality. And it is for the inquisitorial judge to clarify any doubts, if necessary 
prompted by the defence. Because the defence is dependent on the content of the dossier to 
raise matters pre-trial with the prosecution or judge of instruction, or at trial with the court, 
and because there is no total clarity about what documents the dossier should contain – other 
than those that are “relevant”,  the district court of Amsterdam ruled that such a “shadow 
dossier” is “part of the documents of the case and must be presented as soon as the interests 
of the investigation allow, and not only if it contains evidence – whether incriminating or 
disculpatory.”89 We may presume that these rules also apply to cyber-policing; the 
Explanatory Memorandum to Computer Act III specifically states that all activities must be 
recorded (“logged”) with an eye to scrutiny of the investigation.90 Where police methods or 
the identity of investigating officers must be protected, it is possible to have the latter testify 
anonymously and if necessary before the judge of instruction in a procedure separate from the 
trial, where the defence may also ask questions (though not if these would reveal the identity 
of the witness, while other questions may be disallowed).  
This corresponds to the important exception to disclosure in England although there 
are major differences, one being that the protection of witnesses continues during the trial 
phase in the Netherlands, where the transcript of the examination by the judge of instruction 
is available to the trial court (and the defence) and is regarded as evidence, although the 
witness may not be present in person to answer questions.91 The disclosure of sensitive 
material in England92 may be withheld on public interest grounds by virtue of a Public 
Interest Immunity (PII) application. In R v H93 Lord Bingham summarised the operation of 
PII in the following terms: Circumstances may arise in which material held by the 
prosecution and tending to undermine the prosecution or assist the defence cannot be 
disclosed to the defence, fully or even at all, without the risk of serious prejudice to an 
important public interest. The public interest most regularly engaged is that in the effective 
investigation and prosecution of serious crime, which may involve resort to informers and 
under-cover agents, or the use of scientific or operational techniques (such as surveillance) 
which cannot be disclosed without exposing individuals to the risk of personal injury or 
jeopardising the success of future operations. In such circumstances some derogation from 
 
88 The so-called “Schiedam Park case”. See on this and other miscarriages in the Netherlands, C. Brants, 
‘Wrongful Convictions and Inquisitorial Process: The Case of the Netherlands’ (2012) 80 University of 
Cincinnati. Law Review 1071. 
89 Rechtbank Amsterdam, 19 oktober 2009, NbSr 2009, 372. 
90 Wet Computercriminaliteit III, Parliamentary Records IIe Kamer, 2-15-2016, 34 372, no.3, 31. 
91 The protection of (the identity of) a witness is a complicated matter in the Netherlands and subject to specific 
rules in the CCP. Some witnesses may appear in court using a number and in disguise; others may simply be 
heard by the judge of instruction. See W. Dreissen and O. Nauta, Anonimiteit in het strafproces. De praktijk van 
de regeling beperkt anonieme getuige en de regeling bedreigd anonieme getuige in het strafproces, WODC 
report (DSP-groep: Amsterdam, 2012).  
92 Revised Code of Practice to the CPIA 1996 (s.23(1)), para 6.14, “Any material which is believed to be 
sensitive either must be listed on a schedule of sensitive material or, in exceptional circumstances where its 
existence is so sensitive that it cannot be listed, it should be revealed to the prosecutor separately.”. 
93 R v H [2004] UKHL 4. 
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the golden rule of full disclosure may be justified but such derogation must always be the 
minimum derogation necessary to protect the public interest in question and must never 
imperil the overall fairness of the trial.94 
 
c) Admissibility of evidence at trial  
In England and Wales, all relevant evidence is prima facie admissible.95 This includes 
evidence which has been unlawfully or improperly obtained,96although such evidence is 
subject to possible exclusion on the grounds of unfairness. At common law “[a] trial judge in 
a criminal trial has always had discretion to refuse to admit evidence if in his opinion its 
prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value”97, this discretion subsequently took a 
statutory form in PACE:98 In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on 
which the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having 
regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was 
obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of 
the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.99 Case law100 has excluded evidence 
obtained in consequence of “significant and substantial”101 breaches of PACE and PACE 
Code of Practice C102. 
Given what we have said about the principles of policing, it should come as no 
surprise that in the Netherlands intrusive police investigation is a primary concern, addressed 
through the detailed and specific laws, with their attention to necessity and proportionality 
that the European Court requires. Therefore, any police intervention not in accordance with 
those laws will be regarded as illegal and the evidence as illegally obtained. Illegally obtained 
evidence, however, need not mean that it will be excluded, as there is no automatic blanket 
exclusionary rule in the Netherlands. The Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure contained no 
provisions governing the admissibility of illegally or improperly obtained evidence until 
1995, after two rulings (in 1962 and 1978) on these issues by the Supreme Court had 
established an exclusionary rule. The code emphasises the need to repair irregularities, but 
where these are irreparable the trial judge has considerable discretion, as clarified by the 
Supreme Court in 2004 in terms of four options: (i) to note the irregularity but to determine 
that this had consequences for the fairness of the trial; (ii) to  reduce the sentence as form of 
compensation to the guilty party; (c) to exclude the illegally or improperly obtained evidence; 
and (iv), if the irregularity means that due process has been fatally compromise, to declare the 
prosecution inadmissible.103 Following from its earlier rulings, in 2013 the Dutch Supreme 
Court clarified the meaning of Article 359a CCP, which deals with the exclusion of evidence: 
exclusion should only be the sanction if the illegal collection of evidence forms a significant 
infringement of an important procedural rule and one of the following applies:  
1. The illegal collection of evidence means an infringement of the right to a fair trial.  
2. If there has been a significant infringement of another important procedural rule or 
principle and exclusion of the evidence is necessary to prevent comparable infringements.  
 
94 Ibid. at [18]. 
95 Kuruma v The Queen [1955] A.C. 197. 
96 R v Sang [1980] A.C. 402 
97 Ibid at 437. 
98 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.82(3). 
99 Ibid, s.78(1). 
100 R v Walsh (1990) 91 Cr. App. R. 161. 
101 Ibid. at 164. 
102 Dealing with the detention, treatment and questioning of persons by Police Officers.  
103 HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533 
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3. Exceptional situations that demonstrate that such infringements are structural, while the 
authorities responsible do not appear to have taken sufficient steps to prevent infringement of 
the rule concerned.104 
Arguably English and Welsh law has reached a reasonably similar position but by a 
more circuitous and slower route. With cybercrime policing, case law on the use of an agent 
provocateur (sometimes referred to as “entrapment”) could result in potential challenges 
under PACE. This type of covert activity may be more prevalent in the digital environment 
where, for example, police agencies take over marketplaces on the dark web105, create 
fabricated online profiles or even rely on evidence provided by unregulated third parties106. In 
R v Sang, a case which predated the introduction of the PACE exclusionary discretion, Lord 
Diplock indicated:  
The conduct of the police where it has involved the use of an agent provocateur may 
well be a matter to be taken into consideration in mitigation of sentence; but under the 
English system of criminal justice, it does not give rise to any discretion on the part of 
the judge himself to acquit the accused or to direct the jury to do so, notwithstanding 
that he is guilty of the offence.107 
 
The Runciman Commission (1993)108 was divided on the admissibility of evidence obtained 
through what it termed ‘pre-trial malpractice or procedural irregularity’, with the majority 
concluding that changing the law of evidence would not necessary improve police conduct:  
In the view of the majority, even if they believed that quashing the convictions of 
criminals was an appropriate way of punishing police malpractice, it would be naïve 
to suppose that this would have any practical effect on police behaviour. In any case it 
cannot in their view be morally right that a person who has been convicted on 
abundant other evidence and may be a danger to the public should walk free because 
of what may be a criminal offence by someone else. Such an offence should be 
separately prosecuted within the system. It is also essential, if confidence in the 
criminal justice system is to be maintained, that police officers involved in 
malpractice should be disciplined…..109  
 
The majority view, however, may have reflected an assumption of a more interventionist use 
of the PACE exclusionary discretion than may be the case,110as well as perhaps 
overconfidence in post-facto police disciplinary investigation system (reformed in 2020).111 
Where the police exercise the investigatory or interception powers available to them 
they are obliged to record and, where necessary, disclose any information or evidence 
generated as a result of that investigation. Ultimately the consequences of failing to obtain the 
correct authorisation or to comply with disclosure requirements would be the potential 
 
104 HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5321. 
105 See for example of the takedown on 20th July 2017 of the dark web marketplaces AlphaBay and Hansa 
through a coordinated law enforcement operation; https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/massive-
blow-to-criminal-dark-web-activities-after-globally-coordinated-operation <accessed 06/03/2020>  
106 See e.g. CPS legal guidance, Vigilantes on the internet - cases involving child sexual abuse, 03/08/2017, 
revised 18/03/2018, https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/vigilantes-internet-cases-involving-child-sexual-
abuse <accessed 06/03/2020>  
107 R v Sang, above n.96 at 433. 
108 The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Report (Cm 2263, 1993). 
109 Ibid. at paras 48-49. 
110 ibid. at para 50. 
111 The leading case, R v Maxwell [2010] UKSC 48, revealed ‘the gravest police misconduct both before and at 
trial, and it was persisted in during the first set of appellate proceedings’  that had apparently not resulted in 
either prosecution or disciplinary sanctions. [48]; see also [77-84] and [112-114].  
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exclusion of the evidence gathered112 and, in the most serious cases, the discontinuation of 
the proceedings as an abuse of process.113 The current legal position in Maxwell is that: 
 
The interests of justice is not a hard-edged concept. A decision as to what the interests 
of justice requires calls for an exercise of judgment in which a number of relevant 
factors have to be taken into account and weighed in the balance. In difficult 
borderline cases, there may be scope for legitimate differences of opinion.114 
 
This emphasis on judicial discretion tailored to the circumstances of the case as a “balancing 
exercise” is very similar to the position reached in Dutch case law, although with regards to 
cyber-policing and entrapment, the Dutch have partly reached for a different solution. A 
specific form of “internet-entrapment”, the use of a police agent posing as a minor on an 
internet chat site in order to identify sexual predators, is now specifically authorised by the 
Computer Crime Act III through a change to the substantive provision that forbids 
“grooming” (Art. 248e Criminal Code).115 Making use of what is now known as a “decoy 
teenager” seems to fall under the special power of the systematic collection of information, 
requiring authorisation by the prosecutor.116  The English “balancing act” does little, 
however, to assist police seeking anticipative guidance in the course of an investigation. In 
practice, with the policing of cybercrime the problems that this might create may be reduced 
by the creation of a new regime for regulating communication surveillance and equipment 
inference, to which we now turn. 
 
d) Centralised quasi-judicial supervision and judicially led inspection of communication 
surveillance and equipment inference 
Convention obligations have resulted in the juridification of police surveillance and 
interception activities in England and Wales. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
(RIPA) 2000 (as amended by the Investigatory Powers Act (IPA) 2016) certainly introduced 
a more continental style regulation of intrusive law enforcement activity. This process, 
however, was slow, fragmentary and grudging.  It was driven partly by the need to respond to 
‘serial reverses’ at the ECtHR117 and subsequently in litigation – where a prominent centre-
 
112 In the exercise of the Court’s exclusionary discretion, PACE 1984, s.78.  
113 Proceedings may be stayed as an abuse of process where it would not be possible for the accused person to 
receive a fair trial or, where a fair trial is possible, continuing the proceedings would “unacceptably compromise 
the moral integrity of the criminal justice system”, R v Maxwell, above n. 113 at [108]. More generally see: A.A. 
Gillespie ‘"Paedophile hunters": how should the law respond?’ (2019) 12 Crim. L.R., 1016. 
114 R v Maxwell, above n. 113 at [19]. 
115 This article originally required that grooming activities be directed towards a person younger than 16 years of 
age, an objective criterion that obviously did not apply to an investigator posing as such a person. After the 
Court of The Hague had rejected such a case, the Prosecution Service reluctantly ordered that the method no 
longer be used, but advised the government that the law should be changed to make it possible. The new 
provision now criminalises grooming in relation to a person younger than 16 or a person posing as such. 
116 On the possible legal problems in the use of this power, see: J.J. Oerlemans ‘De Wet computercriminaliteit 
III: meer handhaving op internet’, Strafblad, (2017) 350-359.  
117 P. Roberts, ‘Law and criminal investigation’ in T. Newburn, T. Williamson and A. Wright, Handbook of 
Criminal Investigation (Willan: Uffcolm, 2007) 101. 
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left politician and right-wing libertarian made common cause – 118determined by CJEU;119 it 
took some thirty years to put in place.120 The passage of the second act in particular was not 
without controversy. Colloquially described as a ‘Snoopers’ Charter’,121 it was immediately 
subject to successful challenge in the High Court.122 (The Dutch Computer Act III also led to 
criticism because of its potential impact on privacy rights, while the Dutch Federation of 
Journalists vented worries about the possible use of hacking powers with regard to on-line 
journalists and the consequent circumvention of guarantees of the freedom of expression.)123 
The criticisms levelled at IPA primarily related to the powers of bulk interception of 
communications data and the analysis of that data through the use of targeted examination 
warrants. Cumulatively, these criticisms and successful legal challenges eventually led the 
government to abandon intermediate legislation,124 redraft elements of the legislation and, 
following consultation, to issues redrafted Codes of Practice125.  
The result of this considerable amount of litigation, legislation and political argument 
is juridification in a very English guise. The Act of 2016 resulted in the consolidation of 
supervisory and regulatory expertise, with the merger of the Office of Surveillance 
Commissioners, the Intelligence Services Commissioner and the Interception of 
Communications Commissioner into the Office of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner 
(IPCO).126 In addition the Office for Communications Data Authorisations (OCDA) was 
created so that the authorisation of targeted communications data could be transferred from 
Home Office officials to ’an independent arm’s length body’. This is still financed and 
staffed by the Home Office, but its CEO is responsible to the Investigatory Powers 
Commissioner, always a senior member of the judiciary, and not Home Office ministers and 
senior officials. In short the post-IPA regime consists of highly centralised judicial 
supervision over current police investigations, retrospective compliance inspections of police 
forces, and anticipative guidance both in formal published codes and more informal 
contributions to police training and national conferences. 
This unified organisational structure was matched with a similar consolidation of the 
Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s remit and IPCO staff, consisting of judicial 
commissioners (15 at the time of writing) and inspectors. A single group of national 
specialists now oversee – through warrant authorisation and inspections – communications  
data interception, surveillance and equipment interference (‘hacking’) by the police, and also, 
depending on the regulated powers, agencies with police (NCA) or regulatory functions 
(HRC), the intelligence agencies and municipal government. Within this comprehensive 
framework the levels of seniority and the proportionality test for authorising surveillance etc. 
 
118The UK litigation that culminated in Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige v Post-och 
telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the Home Department v Tom Watson, Peter Brice, Geoffrey Lewis 
[2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:970 was initiated in the name of the then leader Deputy leader of the Labour Party and 
MP , Tom Watson and David Davis MP, a libertarian Conservative who ceased to be a party to the litigation 
when he joined the UK Government as the holder of the office of  Secretary of State for Exiting the EU.  
119 Watson and an earlier a successful challenge before the High Court (David Davis and others -v- Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2015] EWHC 2092 (Admin) resulted in the repeal of the Data Retention and 
Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA). 
120 The litigation began at Strasbourg with Malone v UK [1985] 7 EHHR 14 and culminated at Luxembourg in 
2016with Watson 
121 https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/human-rights/privacy/snoopers-charter < last accessed 06/03/2020>  
122 The Queen on the application of the National Council for Civil Liberties (Liberty) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2018] EWHC 975 (Admin)  
123 /www.villamedia.nl/artikel/kritiek-op-wet-computercriminaliteit-iii < last accessed 7 May 2020 
124 The Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA), which was replaced by IPSA. 
125 IPA 2016, Schedule 7, Codes of Practice < https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/investigatory-
powers-act-2016 > last accessed 06/03/2020. 
126 Annual Report of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner 2017, (IPCO: London, 2019).  
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and also the inspection regimes vary to reflect different levels of intrusiveness and sensitivity. 
For the police forces, these two statutes introduced a common legal and organisational 
framework for the regulation of both digital and covert human intelligence sources 
(informers),127 thus ensuring similar approaches to proportionality, necessity and record 
keeping in both online investigations and ‘real world’ surveillance and intelligence 
operations. 
There is a considerable awareness within IPCO that in many countries with broadly 
equivalent oversight bodies the authorisation and inspection functions are divided between 
separate organisations. The combination of oversight and review functions is seen, however, 
as a major strength. ‘The 15 judicial commissioners are able to identify areas which merit 
particular scrutiny on inspection, and the inspectors are well placed to inform the judicial 
commissioners of the issues of relevance to future applications for warrants that were 
identified on inspections.’128 IPCO intend to inspect all UK LEAs annually and, as new 
system came into operation, 39 authorities were inspected in 2018,129  
 
Summary of argument and conclusions 
 
We started this article in the expectation that a comparison of cyber-policing in England and 
Wales and the Netherlands should reveal some interesting differences and possible 
similarities that would afford greater insight into the problems the advent of cybercrime pose 
for the police wherever they may be. There appear to be similarities in abundance, in 
particular in the growing attention paid to cybercrime, in the attempts to legislate specifically 
for cyber-policing and in the notion that rules and regulations designed to combat (organised) 
crime in the real world can be adapted to fit the policing of cyberspace. At first sight, those 
rules also appear similar, as with regard to surveillance, the non-recognition of traditional 
jurisdictional boundaries and the need to obtain authorisation. It is also interesting to note that 
neither country really pays specific attention to the potentially extra complications of policing 
the dark web. Although the Netherlands has a dark web police team, the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Computer Crime Act III merely mentions Tor as a potential 
complicating factor. It may well be that the very name “dark web” conjures up such 
connotations of dangerous, invisible crime, impossible to police, that the legislatures of both 
countries are unwilling to burn their fingers trying to come up with solutions. At the same 
time, the powers to ignore the usual territorial jurisdictional restraints granted to both the 
Dutch and the English police (and in the USA and other European countries), are particularly 
suited to crime-fighting on the dark web and getting round the encryption barriers of the TOR 
network. 
 Although the similarities are many, there are still several important and often subtle 
differences between the Netherlands and England and Wales that reflect the underlying 
ideology of policing, its influence on police (organisation) and legal culture, and the 
difference between inquisitorial and adversarial procedure. Whereas the Dutch police are 
thoroughly aware of the importance of a basis in law for any activity that might infringe on 
individual rights and freedoms, especially privacy (in particular since this point was publicly 
rubbed in during the 1990’s scandal, see above), it is not uncommon to hear senior English 
police officers emphasising that the police in England and Wales are police of and for the 
people – and that they may therefore do anything that is not expressly forbidden.130 It is 
 
127 RIPA Part II. 
128 Investigatory Powers Commissioner, 2017Annual Report (IPCO: London, 2019) para 2.11 
129 Investigatory Powers Commissioner, 2018 Annual Report (IPCO: London, 2020) para 11.5. 
130. Reflects comments and discussion noted during empirical research, including Chatham House Rule NPCC 
organised conferences on 22-25 October 2018 and 19-21 November 2019. 
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perhaps psychologically easier to remember that nothing is allowed unless it is permitted by 
specific legislation, than to know that everything is allowed, but may be forbidden 
somewhere. The Dutch police are helped by the fact that in the Netherlands, the rules of 
covert policing are to be found where all other rules on the use of explicit police powers 
reside, in the Code of Criminal Procedure and in a prosecution directive that clarifies 
ambiguities, with specific powers outlined in the Computer Crime Act III. As is often the 
case in in England and Wales, such rules have grown by accumulation and have been laid 
down in several different pieces of legislation and case law.  
Despite the existence of guidance and the growing importance of Article 8 ECHR in 
the context of criminal procedure in England and Wales following S and Marper v the United 
Kingdom131 and the approach of, in particular, the UK Supreme Court to the question of 
necessity/proportionality in respect of the interference with Article 8, UK police culture does 
not seem to be fully imbued with the automatic reflex of Continental police forces to ask 
where the power they wish to employ is regulated and whether its use would be 
proportionate. Where the Dutch police need guidance is in knowing just how real world 
powers relate to policing the Internet and how to technically employ them. This may also 
apply to the police in England and Wales, but here there is also uncertainty as to where to 
find such powers and what they mean, which creates a strong imperative for clear policies 
and procedures to demonstrate the necessity/proportionality of any interference. Where these 
seem to have been given some body in the post-IPA regulatory regime, that too is 
fragmented, at least compared to the Dutch situation where centralised criminal justice 
authorities provide both authorisation when required and continuous oversight in each case 
rather than periodic inspection. Partly this is due to the Dutch concept of criminal justice 
being broader than that in England and Wales. In the Netherlands, criminal justice relates to 
the processing of criminal offences. It is linked to behaviour (the offence) and not to the 
agency that deals with it. The powers of covert (internet) policing may be employed by many 
agencies (e.g. tax and financial authorities, border control agency, environmental agencies). 
They are triggered by the (seriousness) of a criminal offence and all are governed by the same 
rules and subject to authorisation and oversight by the prosecutor and, should prosecution 
ensue, by the courts. Where the English and Welsh system post IPA is now centralised, the 
Dutch equivalent is both centralised and unified, with a, traditionally, highly powerful Public 
Prosecution Service at its core (this does not apply to the Security Services that are subject to 
a different regime, although security service information does sometimes end up in court as 
evidence). 
As is to be expected, further differences between the countries are to be found in the 
nature of the safeguards that ensure the legality and legitimacy of cyber/policing. It will be 
clear that in accordance with the principles of policing and inquisitorial procedure, great store 
is set in the Netherlands by scrutiny and monitoring of police activity (predominately by the 
prosecutor) to make sure that it does not unnecessarily infringe on individual rights, that it 
conforms with the law and, should it come to a prosecution, that any evidence thus collected 
will be logged in full, is reliable and can be used in court. Such safeguards, with a high 
investment in the presumed impartiality of the inquisitorial prosecutor, exist in particular 
during the pre-trial investigative stage of criminal process, meaning that oversight does not 
rely on the case coming to trial as it does in England and Wales, and that the prosecutor will 
be in a position to know the ins and outs of an ongoing police investigation, or an 
investigation by any other investigative agency. This of course presumes that the prosecutor 
is (technically) knowledgeable enough to be able to judge the necessity and proportionality of 
the measures and methods the investigators wish to employ and that the court will also 
 
131 S and Marper v United Kingdom [2008], ECHR 1581; Application nos. 3056. 
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understand them. English adversarial process relies on irregularities being brought to light by 
the defence in adversarial debate during trial, which explains the supreme importance of 
disclosure. If there is no trial, there will be no scrutiny of the police investigation by anyone 
external to the police organisation. But, again, this depends on knowledge and understanding 
on the part of defence counsel and on full and complete disclosure.  
It should however be noted that in both countries there is an issue with knowledge of 
and insight into cyber/policing and not only with regard to prosecutors, defence lawyers and 
the judiciary who must be able to judge the legality of the evidence. Where both countries 
depend on warrants to ensure the legality of investigative measures, this presupposes that the 
issuing authority will also be able to do the same. This has proved to be a problem in the 
Netherlands concerning “ordinary” covert policing, in particular in relation to telephone taps, 
which require authorisation by the judge of instruction. When the Special Investigative 
Powers Act was evaluated after five years, it became apparent that each tier of scrutiny relied 
upon the previous one to have done its job properly, so that judges of instruction relied on the 
prosecutor and the trial courts on the judge of instruction and, more generally, on the internal 
methods of scrutiny built into the Act. The issuing of warrants was found to have become 
something of a rubber-stamping exercise, with trial judges unable or unwilling to question 
decisions made by previous authorities.132 This is perhaps a particular problem of 
inquisitorial procedure, which, functioning as it does in an environment almost devoid of 
external controls and with far fewer defence rights than is usual in adversarial procedure, in 
essence “polices itself”133  
There is one area in which the Dutch police seem to be at an advantage, and that is in 
the organisation of the police. Greater centralisation seems to provide more coherent policies 
and priorities and to promote specialised knowledge at all levels, something the UK police 
consistently emphasise as lacking, while they also complain that specialised branches have a 
monopoly on knowledge. There is no expectation of organisational centralisation and 
common policies among the heads of the disparate UK forces.134 It would indeed be going 
against the historical and cultural grain to expect the sort of centralisation and division of 
labour foreseen by Stol and Strikwerda (see notes 42 and 47 supra). Which brings us to our 
final point.  
It is sometimes assumed that legal comparison helps identify best practices that can 
then be transferred from one country to another. This is usually a question of wishful 
thinking, or ignorance of the underlying systemic legal-cultural factors that make legal 
transplants a hazardous undertaking. What comparisons can do is help identify bottlenecks 
and barriers to improvement by examining the underlying issues that make the law and its 
enforcement what it is in any given country. In that way, it may point to what is and is not 
possible, at least in the short term. And so it may well prove with cyber-policing. If this 
contribution has managed to make a start, we are well-pleased.  
 
132 A. Beijer et al. De Wet bijzondere opsporingsbevoegdheden – eindevaluatie, Boom Juridische 
uitgevers/Ministry of Justice (Meppel: The Hague, 2004) 159-192. 
133 See on this point C. Brants and S. Field, ‘Truth-finding, procedural traditions and cultural trust in the 
Netherlands and England and Wales: when strengths become weaknesses’ (2016) 20 International Journal of 
Evidence and Proof 266-288. 
134 Noted repeatedly during our research, including at Chatham House Rule NPCC organised conferences on 22-
25 October 2018 and 19-21 November 2019. The reluctant recognition that the police force structure is unlikely 
to change stems from a failed attempt in 2006 to amalgamate the 43 territorial police forces into 24 larger units. 
This had significant professional support, but the cost of implementation was judged too expensive and it met 
with strong popular opposition, see, for example: I. Blair, Policing Controversy (Profile Books: London, 2009) 
295-6. It is also significant that governments over two decades have concentrated on policies that have a 
‘“calculative and contractual mode” of shaping [police] “independence” albeit at a local rather than national 
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